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Abstract: This paper first presents a simple game-theoretic framework for thinking about the 
roles of deterrence and redistribution in peace-keeping. It shows that institutional deficiencies 
and military weakness may combine to undermine the political will of the incumbent 
government in favor of peace, and thus result in the outbreak of violence. Both types of 
policies for buying peace require budgetary resources that are in short supply in post-conflict 
countries. This remark suggests where the international community should focus the 
application of foreign aid for preventing a civil war from resuming. Then, the paper reviews 
the standard institutional response that have been tried to reduce the risk of violent conflict 
erupting. These include federalism, majority rule and power-sharing. The required conditions 
for each type of institutional response to be effective are then brought out. 
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1. Introduction 
The key challenge in post-conflict countries is to avoid restoring the pre-conflict 
situation that led to the outbreak of violence in the first place. There are lots of examples in 
the past where the international community mistakenly took a temporary respite of violence as 
the beginning of a new era of peaceful development, without paying due attention to the 
fundamental determinants of the underlying conflict. During its long civil war, for instance, 
Ethiopia witnessed many such examples, which are described among others in Alex de 
Waal’s 1991 book (Africa Watch, 1991). Then, various infrastructure projects were rebuilt 
time and again with aid money, just to be blown up again by the guerrilla during the next 
round of fighting. Successful reconstruction is thus resting on a conscious conflict-prevention 
strategy, which involves some public expenditure whose benefit cannot be measured by 
standard investment appraisal techniques. 
 Peace is the key public good that a government must provide for economic 
development to take place. Without a credible perspective of lasting peace, there is no policy 
framework that can convince investors to bet on a country’s future development by investing 
in productive and largely irreversible projects. The latter would be seriously at risk if the 
conflict happened to resume. A reflection of this dead-end is provided by the well-known fact 
that civil wars mainly occur in developing countries. Rich countries are those whose political 
and institutional development has reached a point where civil war can be discarded as a major 
risk by investors. 
The theory of conflict-prevention has brought out the main inputs that must be 
provided by a peace-minded government. Azam (1995) describes how some redistribution of 
the resources controlled by the government must in general be combined with military 
expenditures for buying peace. That paper is motivated by reference to various African 
countries, including some post-conflict ones like Ethiopia and Uganda in the 1990s, and some 
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others that had not experienced such conflicts at the time, like Ivory Coast and Senegal. A 
suggestive econometric analysis by Azam et al. (1996) seems to confirm this theoretical 
prediction, by showing how public expenditures with a highly redistributive content, like 
health and education, reduce significantly the occurrence of political violence. The relevance 
of that framework for fiscal policy in post-conflict countries is highlighted by the following 
quote, from the first few lines of the former paper: 
 “The outbreak of a civil war is the worst failure of a peace-keeping policy, or the 
dreadful result of the lack of it. Most countries in the world are made of a heterogeneous 
population, divided by ethnicity, religion, language, ideology, etc. It generally takes some 
conscious effort by the government for a state of peace to be maintained, with some clear 
impact on public finances” (Azam, 1995, p.173). 
However, the success of such a policy is shown in that paper to rest entirely on the 
ability of the government to commit credibly to such a course of action, i.e., to act as a 
“Stackelberg leader” in game-theoretic terms. Furthermore, that paper shows that this 
condition is also required for foreign aid to be used in a social-welfare-enhancing way, rather 
than for increasing military expenditures. A related point about the link between commitment 
and peace was made independently by Fearon (1995) in a working paper applied to the war in 
Croatia in 1991-92. This point is further developed in Azam (2001) which provides a 
discussion of the various means used by African governments for making their promises 
credible. Broadly speaking, they can be grouped in two categories. The first one is comprised 
of the institutional solutions that can be used by the government for “tying its own hands”, by 
creating various kinds of “checks and balances”, including the so-called “agencies of 
restraint”. This line of argument thus shows how political and institutional development must 
go hand-in-hand with economic development. As emphasized by North (1990), the key point 
in institutional development is the provision of commitment devices that help making 
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property rights and human security credible. The second one refers to the build-up by the ruler 
of a credible reputation of faithfulness, based on a rigorous track record of keeping promises. 
The drawback of this second solution is that this kind of personalized political asset is liable 
to disappear when the ruler dies. The example of Ivory Coast is illuminating in this respect, 
where the political capital accumulated by president Houphouet-Boigny during his long stay 
in power got rapidly eroded after his death by his chosen successor, Henri Konan-Bédié. 
Hence, the institutional framework is the key ingredient for establishing credibility in the long 
run, while the ruler’s reputation cannot outlast the latter’s lifetime. Moreover, institutions 
cannot be built in a vacuum, and recent empirical results suggest that a country’s natural 
endowment is a key determinant of its ability to develop the appropriate institutional 
framework for making the government’s promises credible. Fearon (2005) thus shows 
empirically that oil exporters are facing special challenges that undermine their government’s 
credibility and tend to make the occurrence of civil war more probable in this case. Azam 
(2008) offers an interpretation of this phenomenon, based on an analytic narrative of the oil-
related conflict in Nigeria. That paper describes the dynamics of violence in Nigeria, and 
shows how institutional weaknesses, like the governments’ corruption at both the national and 
the local level, eventually made the current low-intensity conflict a cheaper solution than the 
previous strategy of indiscriminate violence against civilians. 
The present paper first provides a simple theoretical framework for discussing these 
issues, in the next section. It emphasizes how the government must balance its expenditures in 
order to produce the right mix of redistribution and deterrence for establishing a lasting and 
credible peaceful equilibrium. The key contribution of this theoretical exercise is to bring out 
that high enough levels of administrative and military efficiency are required for making 
peace credible. Without them, the government’s political will to invest in peace would falter, 
opening the door to violent conflict. Hence, this model provides a theoretical underpinning for 
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the recent emphasis put by the Bretton Woods institutions on institutional reconstruction in 
post-conflict countries. For example, a joint IMF-World Bank document claimed that their 
goal was to assist in rebuilding “the administrative and institutional capacity required to put a 
comprehensive economic program in place” (IMF and World Bank, 2001, pp. 8-9). It shows 
additionally that this institutional effort can usefully be complemented with a similar effort 
invested in the enhancement of military capacity, as a combination of the two is shown to 
minimize the cost of buying the peace.   
Then, the subsequent section discusses various institutional solutions that have been 
tried in poor countries for overcoming the special challenges that they face for implementing 
such a policy mix. In particular, it discusses the issues of power-sharing and of federalism, 
which have been tried in the past for mitigating the war-inducing properties of majority rule in 
ethnically divided societies. The case studies briefly discussed in this section vindicate the 
theoretical prediction mentioned above that weak administrative efficiency might prevent the 
best intentioned political reforms from delivering the peace. This provides also some support 
to the idea advocated by Paris (2004) that strengthening administrative capacity should be 
given priority over democratization or other forms of political liberalization. This section thus 
sets the stage for a discussion of the key objectives to be pursued for making foreign aid 
effective in post-conflict countries. The key warning brought out here is that there is a delicate 
balance to be found between deterrence and credible redistribution for buying the peace, and 
that donors must be extremely cautious in handling this trade-off. While institutional 
development of the post-conflict country is the priority for building a lasting peace, donors are 
facing the temptation to interfere in this process using their superior organizational skills or 
their seemingly more effective NGOs or private contractors. A recent collection of case 
studies edited by Boyce and O’Donnell (2007) illustrates the challenges faced by the donor 
community for addressing these concerns.  
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2. The Optimal Policy-Mix for Conflict Prevention: A Theoretical Framework 
 Let us take a very simple model to capture the stakes of conflict prevention. Two 
players 1 and 2 are trying to share a prize worth P . If they choose to fight for it, they incur a 
cost 1c  and 2c , respectively, which gives them a probability π  and 1 π− , respectively, to get 
P . Their expected gains are then: 
 1 1B P cπ= − ,         (1) 
and: 
 ( )2 21B P cπ= − − .        (2) 
 Assume 1 0B ≥  and 2 0B ≥ . Each player can choose to leave the prize to the other one 
without fighting, and there would thus be no point in allowing for negative values of 1B  or 
2B . Then, the Utilitarian social cost of the conflict may be written as: 
 ( )1 2 1 2 0P B B c c− + = + > .       (3) 
 Denote 1U  and 2U  the two players’ payoffs in case of peace. Then there always exist 
peaceful allocations that are Pareto-preferred to fighting, and such that: 
 1 2U U P+ = , with 1 1U B≥  and 2 2U B≥ .     (4) 
 The key question in conflict theory is thus why these socially preferable outcomes are 
not necessarily implemented. A simple answer can be found in a Coasian framework by 
pointing to a plausible reason why the two players’ property rights are incomplete or ill 
defined. This is what the theoretical literature on the failure of conflict prevention has done, 
by bringing out two main causes of open conflict. The inability to commit credibly to give to 
day part of one’s wealth at a future date is an important conflict-conducive limitation on 
property rights, which Azam (1995) and Fearon (1995) have brought out independently. 
Similarly, asymmetric information is a restriction that prevents the players from conditioning 
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a transfer on some unobservable event without incurring some additional cost1. Azam and 
Mesnard (2003) discuss how these two problems can trigger an open conflict, and provide 
some solutions for overcoming them. In the following, we develop a third potential 
explanation, aimed at capturing how weak institutions may increase the cost of conflict 
prevention, and might thus trigger an open conflict.  
2.1. The Expenditure-Mix for Conflict Prevention 
For the sake of simplicity assume that the endowment P  entirely belongs initially to 
player 1 but with a fairly weak property right such that the other player can take it over with 
probability 1 π−  by triggering the conflict. Player 1 may use two instruments for preventing 
this. First she can give a share g  of her endowment to the other player. This way of “paying 
for the peace” has been widely discussed in the literature since Azam (1995), and the main 
problem raised in this case is how to make the following promise: “I will give you g  if you 
don’t get armed and attack me” credible. The problem raised is that ex post, if the second 
player is not threatening anymore, player 1 has not much incentive to keep her promise. This 
is a classic example of the time-consistency problem. Within a repeated-game framework, 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) base their theory of the economic origins of dictatorship and 
democracy on this question. Democracy is then viewed as a method for making the promise 
made by the rich to redistribute some wealth to the poor credible by giving the latter universal 
franchise, given that there are more of them. Majority rule gives them the power to tax the 
rich, and hence to manage redistribution in their favor. This solution is not necessarily 
workable in developing countries, where ethnic or religious divisions are in some cases more 
salient than income inequality. Then, majority rule might result in the unfettered domination 
by one ethnic group, whose promises to the minority groups might loose any kind of 
credibility. This issue is further discussed below, while the present theoretical exercise puts 
                                                 
1 Contract theory is precisely aimed at analyzing the least-cost way of getting the required information revealed, 
by trading off rent-extraction with some loss of efficiency (see Salanié, 1997).    
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the emphasis on another kind of institutional problem. Hence, we assume for the sake of the 
argument that player 1 can credibly promise to give g  to player 2. Azam and Mesnard (2003) 
use a more flexible specification, by assuming an imperfect ability to commit, such that the 
leading player’s promise is kept with a given probability. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) 
show how such a specification can be derived from an infinite-horizon repeated game. Here, 
we focus instead on institutional inefficiency as a potential cause of open conflict.  
The second tool that player 1 can use for preventing the conflict is deterrence. We 
assume that she can invest irreversibly an amount a  for increasing the cost that player 2 
would have to face were she to choose to get armed and fight. This hypothetical cost of 
conflict is modeled as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 , 0 0, ' 0, '' 0c f a f f a f aθ= > > < .    (5) 
 Hence, a  may capture some investment in weaponry that would make fighting more 
dangerous for player 2, or any other means of deterring rebellion. For example, Azam and 
Hoeffler (2002) show how the incumbent government can terrorize the civilian population in 
order to push it to flee and thus to reduce the capacity of potential rebels to find any support in 
its midst. They show how a “pure terror equilibrium” can exist in their model, where violence 
against civilians is sufficient for deterring potential rebels from taking up arms. This idea is 
applied in Azam (2008) for explaining the indiscriminate violence that was inflicted on 
civilians in the Niger Delta states of Nigeria during the military regime. The θ   parameter 
captures player 1’s efficiency at deterrence, i.e. her military power. We assume decreasing 
returns in deterrence, captured here by the concavity of the ( )f a  function. We further 
assume for the sake of simplicity that player 1 has no incentive to use these weapons ex post 
for attacking player 2 if the latter is not armed. This might be the case, for example, if player 
2 was in a position to consume instantly the whole of her share of the cake were player 1 to 
launch an attack ex post. The latter would thus fail to catch anything valuable. Azam and 
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Saadi-Sedik (2004) offer a deeper discussion of such an issue, in a model where the self-
enforcing threat of sanctions only leads to their implementation in case of challenge, for 
endogenous reasons. This issue is neglected here, for the sake of simplicity. 
 Furthermore, we assume that player 1 is facing some transaction costs for collecting 
these sums g  and a , similar to the “social cost of public funds” that plays a key part in the 
modern theory of economic policy (e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1993). This might capture some 
transport costs for bringing g  to player 2, or a payment to a third party in charge of making 
the promise to pay this sum credible in case of peace, e.g., a Weberian bureaucracy bent on 
applying “rational-legal” rules, made credible by their rigidity.  Similarly, there might be 
some transaction costs for investing a  in deterrence. There might be some cost for creating 
the buildings where the weapons are kept, or for advertising credibly their quantity. In the real 
world, it is not always easy to disentangle deterrence and redistribution expenditures.  For 
example, Howe (2001) shows how armament contracts are often used in Africa for hidden 
redistribution purposes, e.g., when high-ranking generals purchase some out-or-order military 
equipment for maximizing kickbacks, in Nigeria in particular. Governments then turn a blind 
eye on such transactions, for the sake of buying off these officers, while potential rebels might 
believe that these military equipments might be suitable for defense purposes.   
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that these two kinds of expenditures imply the 
same unit transaction cost γ . If player 1 is understood as the government and player 2 as a 
potential rebel, then γ  measures institutional inefficiency, i.e., the fraction of budgetary 
resources that is lost between their collection and the actual expenditures. This might describe 
the running cost of public administration, the result of corruption, or the social costs of 
inefficient taxation, etc. The part played by such a “melting ice” assumption as an obstacle to 
peace is discussed in Azam (2006 b), using a fairly different model. Under these assumptions, 
player 1 would solve the following problem, were she to choose peace:  
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 ( )( )1 ,* max 1g aU P g aγ= − + + ,      (6) 
subject to player 2’s participation constraint, for convincing the latter not to choose war: 
 ( ) ( )2 2 1U g B P f aπ θ= ≥ = − − ,      (7) 
player 1’s budget constraint, beyond which player 1 cannot make a credible promise: 
 ( )( )1P g aγ≥ + + ,        (8) 
and player 1’s own participation constraint: 
 1 1*U B≥ .         (9) 
 Combining (8) and (9) shows that the budget constraint cannot be the binding one that 
prevents player 1 from choosing peace, because in this case: 
 1 1* 0U B≥ ≥ .         (10) 
 Therefore, the steps to follow are first to find 1 *U  subject to (6) and (7), and then to 
check whether or not (9) holds too. Player 1 has no reason to leave any positive rent to player 
2, so that the latter’s participation constraint (7) will be binding. Then, writing the latter as a 
binding equality allows us to establish proposition 1: 
Proposition 1 : The level of deterrence expenditure *a  chosen by player 1 is strictly positive 
if the following inequality holds: 
 ( )' 0 1fθ > .         (11) 
Proof: Substitute constraint (7) into the objective function (6). Then player 1’s problem boils 
down to: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )min 1 1a P f a aγ π θ+ − − + .      (12) 
 The first-order condition for an interior solution is thus: 
 ( )' * 1f aθ = .         (13) 
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 The second-order condition requires that ( )f a  be concave, so that ( ) ( )' * ' 0f a f<  if 
* 0a > . If the interior solution does not exist, with ( )' 1, 0f a aθ > ∀ ≥ , then player 1 chooses  
( )( )1* 1 0a f Pπ θ−= − > . QED 
 
Figure 1: The Choice of Redistribution and Deterrence 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the combination of redistribution and deterrence expenditures 
chosen by player 1 for minimizing her private cost of maintaining peace. For constructing this 
diagram, we define: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )* * 1 *g a P f aπ θ= − −  and  ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0g P fπ θ= − − .  (14) 
 Figure 1 clearly shows why deterrence is chosen by player 1 when ( )' 0 1fθ > , as we 
have in this case ( ) ( )* * * 0g a a g+ < . Hence, the sum of her optimal redistribution and 
deterrence expenditures is lower than the redistribution expenditures required for maintaining 
peace without any deterrence. If we interpret player 1 as being the government, then the 
policy-mix described at figure 1 is the one that minimizes the use of public funds for buying 
the peace. This entails that this is the policy-mix that maximizes the amount of public 
( )( )1 1f Pπ θ− −  *a
( )*g a  
( )* * *g a a+





resources left for other use, e.g., for productive investment if that government has true 
developmental objectives. However, we show now that it does not minimize the social cost of 
peace, understood in a broader sense. 
2.2. The Social Cost of Peace 
Peace in this model is socially costly in two different ways. First, one can show easily 
that it is not Pareto-preferred to war. This can be seen by remarking that the difference 
( ) ( )0 * *g g a−  is equivalent to a tax levied under threat by player 1 on player 2. The level 
( )0g  of the transfer is equal to the expected gain that player 2 would get in case of war, if 
player 1 was not investing any resource in deterrence, while ( )*g a  is her gain in case of 
peace, given the level of deterrence expenditures invested by player 1. Therefore, peace 
entails a net gain for player 1, otherwise she would choose war and give up deterrence, while 
it entails a net loss for player 2 worth ( ) ( )0 * *g g a− . Hence, peace is not Pareto-preferred to 
war, ex ante, as soon as there is a strictly positive level of deterrence expenditures. In other 
words, peace is imposed by player 1. The latter proposition may be viewed as a simple variant 
of Hobbes’ theory of the Leviathan (Hobbes, 1651). However, the present model adds the 
redistribution dimension, which mitigates the seemingly illiberal overtone of that result. 
On the other hand, conflict prevention maximizes ex post social welfare if one chooses 
the Rawlsian maximin as a social-choice criterion. This is because war implies that either one 
or the other player will loose everything with some probability, whereas peace guarantees a 
positive gain to each one of them. Therefore, deterrence works in this model like a system of 
compulsory insurance, which prevents the players from loosing everything on a bet. Hence, 
this model shows that one can justify a pacifist position as an application of Rawls’ (1971) 
liberal theory of justice, as it implies that each player would be better off in case of peace than 
in the worst case, were she to loose the war. Investing in peace may then be described as a 
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kind of “safety first” approach to social risk management. Similarly, one can see this position 
as an application of Sen’s idea of “the impossibility of a Paretian liberal” (Sen, 1970), which 
implies that some values must prevail in some cases over Paretian efficiency2. The views of 
the classical liberals on this subject can be summarized by the following quote from Paine 
(1791): “Government […] promotes peace, as the true means of enriching a nation” (cited by 
Howard, 2008, p. 20). 
 Furthermore, one can also show that peace is socially costly in Utilitarian terms. Given 
the constraints presented above, and that player 1 has no reasons to leave any positive rent to 
player 2, so that 2 2U B= , we can define the Utilitarian social cost of peace as:
 ( ) ( )1 2* 1P U U g aγ γ− + = + + .      (15) 
Therefore, in this model, peace is not a gift from heaven, and must be produced by 
investing some resources in conflict prevention. Notice that the social unit cost of 
redistribution is generically lower than the cost of deterrence. Therefore, the Utilitarian social 
cost of peace would be minimized if the latter was purchased exclusively by a transfer, 
without any deterrence expenditures. Hence, player 1’s privately optimal choice does not 
minimize the Utilitarian social cost of peace, which would require bringing the level of 
deterrence to zero. Moreover, one can easily check that  *a  is an increasing function of θ , in 
the interior solution, so that player 1 will spend more on it, the more effective it is at 
increasing player 2’s hypothetical cost of conflict. In other words, the Utilitarian social cost of 
deterrence increases with its effectiveness. This prediction is not valid anymore in a corner 
solution, when player 1 only uses deterrence for buying peace.  
 Proposition 1 and figure 1 describe the peaceful equilibrium, if the latter happens to be 
chosen by player 1. What remains to be determined is the condition under which the latter will 
make this choice, i.e., to find the parameters that ensure that (9) holds.  
                                                 
2 Sen writes in the conclusion of that article: “ …if someone does have certain liberal values, then he may have 
to eschew his adherence to Pareto optimality” (p.132 in Hahn and Hollis, 1979). 
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2.3. Conflict Prevention Faced with Transaction Costs 
 The model presented above allows us to bring out how the institutional inefficiency 
captured by γ  can reach such a level that the peace becomes too expensive to keep for player 
1. This is expressed in proposition 2: 
Proposition 2: Peace will not be kept by player 1 if: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )1
* *
1 * *
c f a a
P f a a
θγ π θ
+ −> − − − .     (16) 
Proof: We can write: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1* 1 1 * *U P P f a aπ γ π γ θ= − − + + − .   (17) 
and thus, 1 1*U B<  if inequality (16) holds. QED 
Figure 2: The Choice between War and Peace 
 
  Proposition 2 shows that the minimum level of institutional efficiency required for 
player 1 to choose peace is higher, (i) the higher is the required transfer for buying off player 




















and (ii) the lower is the direct cost of war, with low values of 1c . Notice as well that 
proposition 2 brings out the social gain produced by deterrence, ceteris paribus, despite its 
cost described above. Given γ , peace is generically chosen by player 1 if θ  is high enough. 
In that case, deterrence is effective enough for compensating the transaction cost entailed by 
this investment. Figure 2 enables us to see this result better. The upward sloping curve in the  
{ },γ θ  space represents the locus of the parameter values such that (16) holds with equality. 
All the points located above this locus have a too high level of institutional inefficiency for 
peace to be chosen by player 1, while all the points located to the right show a high enough 
level of efficiency at deterrence for compensating the transaction costs and making peace 
attractive for her. Figure 2 depicts the case where 1 *c a> , but the opposite case would be 
equally acceptable too. 
 Let us emphasize a property that the present model shares with most conflict models 
of this kind. The choice between war and peace here belongs to player 1, i.e., the “Stackelberg 
leader”. In most applications of this kind of models, this will represent the government. 
Hence, this property of most conflict models is in direct opposition to a widespread view, 
which is fairly tautological, and that the World Bank in particular has recently defended 
(World Bank, 2003). According to that view, the cause of civil wars is the presence of rebels. 
This is tautological, as the proposition can be as convincingly reversed, as the cause of the 
rebels’ presence can be said to be the civil war. In fact, the responsibility for the conflict 
always rests on the government in this kind of models. Rocco and Ballo (2008) have 
developed this point for making it a theory of provocation, with an application to the recent 
civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. They show how the government can trigger the uprising by 
choosing a policy that violates the potential rebels’ participation constraint. This theoretical 
insight meets a common sense idea that is well captured by the following quote: “Political 
will: a fundamental precondition” (Colletta et al., 1996, p.6), which basically means that no 
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government can ever be coerced into choosing peace. The additional contribution of conflict-
theory is to show that such political will is itself endogenous, depending on some deeper 
parameters. Figure 2 helps us to understand how such a political will can be brought about, by 
improving simultaneously institutional and military efficiency. 
 2.4. The Scope for Peace-Inducing Foreign Aid 
 Proposition 2, represented at figure 2, also shows that war is in this model the result of 
a dual inefficiency of the government. As mentioned above, even a high level of 
administrative inefficiency, implying a high transaction cost, could be consistent with peace if 
the level of military efficiency was high enough. However, peace is also consistent with other 
combinations of efficiency levels. Even with a low level of military efficiency, i.e., with a low 
value of θ , player 1 might very well choose peace if her level of administrative efficiency 
was sufficiently high, with a low value of γ . This analysis clearly suggests that increasing the 
efficiency of public funds management for public administration and deterrence is more 
important than trying to increase the size of the pie over which people have conflicting 
claims. Based on survey data on Uganda, a typical post-conflict African country, Reinikka 
and Svensson (2004) have shown how to increase the share of the public money reaching its 
target in education, one of the most redistributive type of public expenditure. Their results 
show that disclosing the information about these flows more transparently can help 
significantly to mobilize the parents for exercising an effective pressure on this sector’s public 
administration. This provides a very cheap way of enhancing administrative capacity, which 
seems especially appropriate at the local level. More generally, all kinds of policies aimed at 
improving public service delivery to the population may also be understood as a way of 
reducing γ , and thus as a means to strengthen the government’s political will to build peace. 
Hence, this diagram illustrates vividly how the donor community can help the post-
conflict country to create a peaceful environment for attracting investors and boosting growth. 
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The importance of supporting the reconstruction of government institutions and of the rule of 
law has been recognized by the World Bank for a long time (e.g., World Bank, 1998). The 
additional insight brought out by the foregoing theoretical analysis is that the peace can be 
bought more efficiently by combining this institutional reconstruction with a concurrent effort 
at improving the government’s military capabilities. The aim is to move south-easterly in that 
space, as illustrated on figure 2 by the thick arrow, by reducing institutional inefficiency and 
increasing simultaneously the level of effective deterrence. The upward slope of the cut-off 
locus means that a peace-minded intervention involves some complementarity, such that the 
effort needed on either front is less demanding, the higher is the effort made on the other 
front. The type of support that can be given to help a post-conflict government increase the 
professionalism of its armed forces is illustrated by the ACRI (African Crisis Response 
Initiative) program launched by the U.S. government in Africa (Bierman, 1999). The latter 
involved the training and reinforcement of the armed forces of various African countries 
selected according to their commitment to some democratic values. Howe (2001) provides a 
thorough discussion of its achievements and its limitations. Another example is given by the 
British intervention in Sierra Leone, which resulted in the retraining of 8 500 troops. The 
latter rather effective program is criticized by Paris (2004) precisely for its narrow focus: 
“What the peacebuilders did, in effect, was to focus on one vital institution of the Sierra 
Leone government – the army – and make it more effective in order to deter and suppress 
violent challenges to the electoral process or its results” (Paris, 2004, p.223).  The other 
institutions of the Sierra Leone government were given much less attention. 
 
3. Institutions for Conflict Prevention: Some Lessons from Experience 
 The need for setting up a credible institutional framework for peace as a prerequisite 
for development is strikingly illustrated by the case of Chad. There, sizable oil reserves were 
discovered in the wake of the 1974 oil shock, but they were only exploited in 2003. In the 
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words of Azam and Djimtoïngar (2008): “It is only after peace was secured, and institutions 
were put in place to make it credible, that foreign oil companies ventured into exploiting oil” 
(Azam and Djimtoïngar, 2008, p.87). Hence, the oil reserves remained in the ground for 
nearly three decades while the oil companies were waiting for the Chadians to sort out their 
political problem. The technical problems were solved very quickly as soon as the oil 
companies decided that the time was ripe for exploiting the oil, and the pipe-line across 
Cameroon was built in a few months. The kind of wait-and-see attitude that this example 
epitomizes is a characteristic of many other potential investors in Africa, and more generally 
in developing countries. The key issue then is to identify what kind of institutional framework 
can convince the potential investors to cross the line and start building up some productive 
capacity in the country.  
This issue has been discussed intensively in the historical literature devoted to 
European development. The famous paper by North and Weingast (1989) demonstrates how 
the constitution that emerged from the “Glorious Revolution” (1688) in England imposed 
enough restraint on the subsequent kings to provide a fairly safe environment for investors, 
which led eventually to the so-called “Industrial Revolution”. However, Stasavage (2003) 
shows that this constitutional framework provides only one side of the story, while the 
balance of forces within the resulting parliament was in fact the mainstay of the subsequent 
investor-friendly environment. Similarly, in developing countries nowadays, constitutional or 
other institutional frameworks are just empty shells unless they are a reflection of a balance of 
forces between the main interest groups. This is why the Neo-Conservative agenda of 
democratizing across the board has led to many political disasters: institutions are largely 
endogenous, and reflect the peaceful or violent interaction between well-defined groups. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have provided the fundamental analysis of the determinants 
of dictatorship and democracy in an economy where income distribution is the main issue. 
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However, in Africa and many other developing countries, groups are defined along ethnic or 
religious lines, and different solutions have to be devised. Then, majority rule does not 
necessarily create the right environment, as it might result in a dictatorship of the majority, 
entailing a potential exclusion of minority groups, which are then cornered into violent 
rebellion. Fearon (1998) shows how the prospect of majority rule might trigger a violent 
conflict in an ethnically divided country. An illuminating linguistic analysis by Shaffer (1998) 
of the word “democracy” in the Wolof language in Senegal strongly suggests that majority 
rule is not an aim in itself for the African population. The latter seem to adhere spontaneously 
to the view held by Classical Liberalism of democracy as government by discussion, whose 
aim is really to build consensus rather than to exclude minority viewpoints. Azam (2006 a) 
provides a different analysis of endogenous political regimes aimed at capturing better the 
stakes of the political game in African society. That model brings out the fundamental 
determinants of the choice between war and peace, on the one hand, and in case of peace, the 
choice between a redistributive regime and a military dictatorship, on the other hand. In 
particular, it shows how the relative endowments of the ethnic groups interact with the 
government’s credibility for determining the equilibrium political regime. 
   Two main types of institutional frameworks have been tried in Africa for creating 
the required “checks and balances” for enhancing the credibility of the government’s 
promises to redistribute across ethnic groups, namely federalism and power-sharing 
agreements. However, the examples discussed below suggest that such schemes might not 
deliver the required credibility when other forms of institutional weaknesses interfere with the 
smooth working of the redistribution scheme in such a way that the money does not reach the 
target population.  
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3.1. Power-Sharing and Credibility: Some African Examples 
The recent experience of Kenya, in March and April 2008, illustrates vividly the dead-
end where a narrow-minded application of the Neo-Conservative doctrine can lead a country. 
While the minority government ran by Daniel Arap Moi since the late 1970s had managed to 
keep the country together, with limited violence, a blunt application of majority rule resulted 
predictably in the eruption of widespread violence. Moi was a Kalendjin, from a very small 
ethnic group renown for the numerous gold medals it won for Kenya at the Olympic games. 
He was thus missing the kind of popular mass-support that rulers from large ethnic groups 
enjoy. His ability to stay in power thus rested on his strategy of keeping a fair balance in the 
distribution of the spoils between the larger ethnic groups, mainly via their elites. In the words 
of Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005): “The multiethnic ruling class did not break ranks, so we did 
not see a strong elite movement to forge an ethnically based rebel group” (Kimenyi and 
Ndung’u, 2005, p. 154). Moi’s weakness as an ethnic leader was thus a key ingredient for 
making his promises credible. Under the intrusive influence of the US administration, 
represented in that case by Colin Powell, a majority government was put in place in the early 
2000s. The latter government was entirely dominated by the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu. 
Unfortunately, majority rule was then interpreted as a license to exclude from power the other 
large ethnic group, the Luo. The latter remained relatively calm during the first term of the 
Kikuyu regime, waiting for “their turn at the trough”. However, the 2008 elections brought 
the incumbent coalition back to power, raising the prospect of another term of exclusion for 
the Luo. This led to a popular uprising, leaving a long trail of innocent victims behind. The 
ensuing popular violence could only be stopped by over-ruling the election results, and 
organizing a power-sharing scheme including representatives of the Luo minority. Sheer 
common sense thus managed to beat the Neo-Conservative dogma and to bring peace back. 
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Chad provides a more dramatic example where power-sharing succeeded in ending 
decades of violence and to convince investors as mentioned above. Because the resulting 
political equilibrium has been in place for nearly two decades, its analysis is liable to provide 
some additional insight on the conditions for such a scheme to succeed. A closely related 
analysis could be made of the case of post-conflict Uganda, where Museveni’s NRM 
established a controversial form of inclusive “democracy”, which presided over an economic 
recovery that was regarded as an example for the whole continent by the international 
community (Mutibwa, 1992).  Most ethnic groups were then represented in government, with 
the exception of a small northern rebellion. 
In Chad, the Southerners ruled the country from Independence to the civil war, under a 
single-party regime. Ever since 1965, a low intensity insurrection had been going on in the 
north, structured by the Frolinat (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad), a rebellion led by 
the two Toubou rivals Goukouni Oueddeï and Hissein Habré. Goukouni is the son of the 
Gedré, the highest traditional authority of his group, while Habré is from a lower caste of the 
same group, the Goranne. Habré was in turn the last prime minister before the civil war, after 
a coup had toppled François Tombalbaye’s dictatorial government, and the second president 
of the post-war period, until 1990. This occurred when the victorious northerners began to 
rule the country, after a short interim leadership of Goukouni. The latter had developed some 
very close relationships with the Libyan ruler Khadafi, while the former was an inflexible 
nationalist, who always fought hard to keep Khadafi out of Chad. This got him at times a 
serious US support, providing France with a competitive pressure to adopt a firm stance over 
these matters. The latter provided him with the required military support, delivering arms and 
a discrete help with ‘technical advisors’, when it came to push the Libyan army out of the 
country. Habré lost the French support by selling the captured high-tech Soviet military 
hardware to the US in 1987, without letting the French have a look at it. He was thus dumped 
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by Paris when his former ally Idriss Déby launched an attack from the Sudanese territory, and 
seized N’Djamena very quickly in 1990.  
The latter comes from the Zarghawa group, whose territory lies on both sides of the 
Sudanese border, with only about 30 to 40 % of its population living inside Chad, and the rest 
in the Darfur region of neighboring Sudan. His presidential guard has thus been staffed up to 
now with a large proportion of Sudanese Arab-speaking elite soldiers. The Zarghawa are 
Muslim Arab speakers, with natural relations with the Goranne. After the civil war, the 
country was not immediately peaceful. Beside the Libyan failed invasion mentioned above, 
this period saw a lot of military activity. The “codos” rebellion movements emerged in the 
south, from 1983 to 1986, and then from 1992 to 1999. This triggered two massive waves of 
very harsh repression by the Habré government first, and then by the Idriss Déby one. This 
involved a lot of massacre of innocent civilians, many villages being burnt to ashes and 
deleted from the map. Buijtenhuijs (1998) does not hesitate to characterize these massacres as 
“genocidal”. He estimates that more than 1000 southerners have been killed every year during 
those two episodes. Moreover, over-armed herdsmen from the north, where most of the 
fighting took place for more than a decade, started to cross the Chari river in order to feed 
their cattle in the cotton fields, shooting dead with impunity the resisting farmers. Neither the 
administration, nor the judicial authority, now dominated by the northerners, would take any 
action against this type of roving banditry, because quite a lot of these cattle are in fact owned 
by high-ranking officials. Thus, crime became “the continuation of war by other means” in 
the south. There are no precise estimates of the number of southern peasants who have 
emigrated to neighboring Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Nigeria. However, to the 
surprise of most observers, the northerners got the majority in the electoral census prior to the 
1996 elections (see Buijtenhuijs, 1998). Some claim that many farmers have deserted their 
fields because of this threat, and that this is the root cause of the ending of the post-
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devaluation cotton-led boom. No data is available to examine statistically the exact 
significance of these claims, as most of these assaults are left unreported. 
Nevertheless, the Déby regime is rightly regarded as a more satisfactory regime, which 
lives on since 1990. The key to its relative success is that it has established some regional 
balance at the head of the state. Déby chose Kamougué, the General who organized the 
resistance in the south, during the civil war and the subsequent massacres, as the president of 
the national assembly. This is formally the second position in the state hierarchy. Moreover, 
all the military units of the southern rebellion were not dismantled, but were instead enrolled 
in the Chadian army. Thus, Kamougué represented a genuine personal power, as he could 
mobilize several military units in case of need. This ability to strike back that Déby left to the 
Southerners is a key commitment device for convincing the latter that he would leave them a 
fair share of the oil revenues, as they could thus punish him for defaulting, in the off-
equilibrium path. Azam (2006 b) provides a theoretical analysis of this kind of strategy. In 
addition, some decentralization was adopted with the new constitution approved by 
referendum on March 31, 1996. Three levels of local governments were created on the French 
pattern, with communes (both rural and urban) at the bottom, departments at the intermediate 
level, and regions. Hence, Déby based his peace-keeping strategy partly on credible power-
sharing with the southerners, and succeeded thus in halting the downward spiral that 
characterized this economy before the civil war. The economy recovered partly, with some 
positive growth of per capita GDP at local constant prices in the 1990s. In the oil sector at 
least, investors then recovered enough confidence to launch the exploitation of the oil fields, 
more than 25 years after their discovery. This strategy of regional balance was reinforced in 
April 2001 by the selection as prime minister of Nagoum Yamassoum, a southerner, while 
Déby was re-elected in May 2001, with 67.35 % of the votes. The irruption of the oil money 
in the public coffers starting in 2003 did not trigger a new round of political violence for 
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determining the shares of the spoils going to each group. The Chadian national assembly had 
passed a law on December 30, 1998, aiming at providing various guarantees about the use of 
the oil money. It allocated the various direct or indirect revenues from oil to different 
accounts in the government budget, in an attempt to avoid sneaky diversions of this money 
and created a watchdog committee, called the “Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des 
Ressources Pétrolières” for monitoring the use of this oil money. A law passed on June 21, 
2000, reinforced the presence of civil society in this supervision committee, beside the 
representatives of the parliament, the central bank and the treasury, the Supreme Court, etc.  
Nevertheless, peace and the enforceability of this legal device are jointly determined. 
So far, the peace between the former two enemies, the Muslim Northerners and the Christian 
Southerners has survived. However, some sporadic violence remained in some parts of the 
country, epitomized by the killing of the chief of staff of the Chadian army in an ambush in 
the north of the country in early 2001. More recently, a new kind of military activity has 
erupted, as some members of Déby’s family, two of his nephews in particular, have tried to 
topple him with some support from Sudan’s president Al Bachir. Then, the World Bank 
rightly allowed Idriss Déby to use some of the oil money that was kept in store for the future 
generations to be used for stepping up military expenditures and to defeat the rebels. This is a 
different kind of political violence, which erupted inside the ruling group and is based on a 
disagreement over the credible redistribution policy that bought peace for nearly two decades.  
3.2. The Limits of Federalism 
Power-Sharing seems to reach its limits when a peaceful institutional framework must 
be put in place in a large country, with many ethnic groups to care for. Federalism then 
provides an attractive solution, which was applied successfully in post-war Ethiopia. There, 
the victorious Tigrayans subdivided the country into a large number of ethnically 
homogenous provinces, after about three decades of civil war that ended in 1991. Moreover, 
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the victorious Tigrayian army did not dismantle and demobilize the whole defeated Amhara 
dominated one. On the contrary, many units of it were kept and merged with some units from 
the Tigrayian guerilla to build the new Ethiopian army, while some of the victors were asked 
simply to go back to their mountains. Like the Chadian example mentioned above, the 
Ethiopian experience supports the view that disarming the defeated side is not a clever thing 
to do for establishing a long-lasting peace. A more balanced outcome, where the new army is 
comprised of units from the two sides, seems preferable. For nearly two decades now, civil 
peace has prevailed, while a short war against Eritrea broke out in the mean time. Similarly, 
the Malian government gave a lot of autonomy to the northern people after the low-intensity 
civil war that took place in the first half of the 1990s. Like in the Chadian and the Ethiopian 
cases, the Malian government enrolled many former Tuareg rebels in its regular army. The 
attraction of federalism or regional autonomy comes from the fact that it gives local elites 
some power for dealing with a large part of their ethnic group’s affairs. This is supposed to 
ease tensions, by mediating the relationships between the local ethnic group and the central 
government’s administration, which is often perceived as alien by the local people. Moreover, 
it keeps the local elites busy, detracting their attention away from the central government and 
the potentially disrupting competition for its control. This reduces mechanically the stakes 
involved in nation-wide politics and thus reduces the risk of a major intra-state conflict. 
However, the Nigerian example suggests that there are additional institutional 
conditions for the federal solution to buy peace. From independence to the civil war, Nigeria 
was divided administratively into three regions, each relying mainly on its own resources. The 
North had cotton and groundnuts; the West had cocoa, rubber, timber, palm oil, as well as the 
services of the port of Lagos. Finally the East had palm oil and petroleum. The Biafra war 
prompted the government to nationalize the oil, by the 1969 Petroleum Act, with a view to 
manage centrally the redistribution of oil revenues between regions. A presidential decree of 
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1975 further increased the central government’s share, in the midst of the oil boom, from 50 
% to 80 %. A further step in the appropriation of oil resources by the central government was 
taken in 1978 by the Land Use Decree, which essentially gave the right to the local governors, 
then military appointees, to expropriate any local community of their land in order to ease the 
job of oil- or mining companies (Ghazvinian, 2007). At the same time, the military 
government aimed at weakening the regional powers by subdividing the regions into twelve 
states with very limited powers. By 1991, there were thirty states in Nigeria, while popular 
violence was rising in many places, demanding the creation of additional states (Gboyega, 
1997). Most of the time, these popular uprisings were triggered by a sense of unfairness by 
some minority ethnic groups, which were looking for the creation of new states where they 
would become dominant. These demands were in fact largely ignored by the military 
government. Rustad (2008) remarks: “… many states borders are not drawn along ethnic 
lines, but are rather creating multiethnic states” (p.24). The current number of states, i.e., 36, 
was reached in 1996. Moreover, quite a lot of the political debate got crystallized on the 
allocation formula for allocating revenues to the states and the different levels of government. 
As emphasized by Gboyega (1997), violence grew steadily all along the period of military 
government, with a particular concentration in the Niger Delta states, where oil production is 
located. The military government mainly relied on repression and indiscriminate violence 
against civilians for containing the popular discontent. Azam (2008) provides an analytic 
narrative of this violence and its consequences. 
 In fact, federalism does not seem to have reduced the tensions in Nigeria. Its key 
drawback was dramatically brought out after the 1999 elections, which started the return to 
civilian rule. A former general and hero of the Biafran war, Olusegun Obasanjo, won these 
elections and benefited initially from a very favorable popular opinion. Despite his Yoruba 
origin, Obasanjo has acquired a truly national reputation, and he is rejected by the most 
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radical members of his own ethnic group. He first ruled the country from 1976 to 1979, as a 
military president, and organized a first handover to a civilian government in 1979. This gave 
him a credible democratic legitimacy, reinforced by the few months that he spent in jail under 
General Abacha’s dictatorship. He started to signal his drive for solving the main political 
problem of Nigeria, namely the violence going on in the oil-producing states, by reducing the 
use of violence and relying more on redistribution. He fired many generals of the previous 
period, and took various measures for curbing the power of the military. Then, he tried to 
increase the role of redistribution by increasing the share of oil revenues going back to the oil-
producing states through the so-called derivation fund from 3 % to 13 %. Unfortunately, the 
level of corruption prevailing at the state government’s level, where this revenue flow is 
going, is such that very little of that money trickles down to the local population. Hence, this 
move failed to buy the peace in the oil-producing states, not because Obasanjo was not 
trustworthy, but because he turned out to be unable to overcome the corruption barrier that 
prevented the money from reaching its targets. This example highlights the need for a 
relatively “clean” institutional framework for federalism to work as a peace-buying device. 
 Then, a highly revealing event clearly illustrates Obasanjo’s conciliatory strategy. 
During the 2000s, the most dangerous rebellion going on in Nigeria was due to the Ijaws, the 
most important ethnic group of the Niger Delta states. Although it is a fairly small group by 
its size, it is the fourth largest one in Nigeria, after the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Igbo. 
During the summer 2004, an Ijaw youth movement had turned into an armed rebellion 
comprised of about 2000 men, under Dokubo Asari’s leadership. His financial resources were 
mainly coming from “bunkering”, i.e., the theft of kerosene from the pipe-lines for smuggling 
the resulting fuel out to the world market, through some well-organized illegal networks.  The 
rebellion had managed to take over Port Harcourt in August 2004, despite the intervention of 
the Nigerian army’s helicopters, which led to the death of several hundred people. In order to 
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solve speedily this problem, under the discrete pressure of the US government, Obasanjo 
invited Asari at Aso Rock, the presidential palace in Abuja. The two men found an agreement 
while an American official was present in the room as a witness, according to which Asari 
was “selling” to Obasanjo his movement’s weapons (mainly a few AK 47s) for a given sum 
of money, amounting to one million US $ according to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 
2006). Asari committed to stop his rebellion in return for a general amnesty and the promise 
not to be attacked by the Nigerian army (Ghazvinian, 2007). This seems to stretch credulity, 
at least for a Western economist, but this agreement succeeded in stopping this episode of 
violence, and permitted the resumption of oil production.   
 This genuinely African approach proved to be more effective than the increase in the 
derivation fund mentioned above. The country’s federal structure had been devised by the 
military governments as a way to buy off the local elites for diverting their political ambition 
away from the central government. This entails that the bulk of the money flowing to the 
states’ governments is diverted by the governors in favor of their close clientele (Ghazvinian, 
2007). Hence, the social cost of redistribution in favor of the rebels or their supporters, which 
is captured by γ  in the theoretical model presented in the previous section, turns out to be 
very high in Nigeria. Obasanjo probably had underestimated this parameter at the beginning 
of his term in office. Finally, Asari ended up in jail, suggesting that the limits of the 
conciliatory approach have been reached (ICG, 2006). Consequently, the respite was short-
lived, and violence resumed its build-up in the course of 2005-2006. Ghazvinian cites an 
estimate of 1000 death per year, a figure which cannot be verified. Eventually, then, the 
conflict in the Niger Delta states saw its intensity rise over that period, as deterrence had been 
rolled back by the civilian government, while redistribution turned out to be out of reach. This 
conflict can be analyzed as a reciprocal-looting one of the type described by Azam (2002). 
The rebels are stealing a lot of fuel that is sold on the black market to some well-organized 
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networks, which dispatch it all over West Africa and further, and they top up their financial 
resources by kidnapping some of the oil-firms’ employees for a ransom. The government and 
the oil firms are destroying more and more the environment in the Niger Delta states, for 
saving money on the required investments for reducing oil spills and gas flaring. This reduces 
the local population’s ability to make a living in legal activities like agriculture and fishing, 
strengthening their incentive to steal fuel from the pipe-lines. This phenomenon is described 
in game-theoretic terms as “strategic complementarity”, as the looting performed by one side 
is reinforcing the incentive to loot faced by the other side, which creates a multiplier effect 
(see Azam, 2002). Then, the oil firms have not much incentive to invest resources in pollution 
control, and they have in fact reduced their activity in the most exposed areas. The shortfall of 
Nigerian oil production below the trend is estimated at about 25 %, with a potential impact on 
the world market price. The oil firms have responded by relocating an increasing fraction of 
their African oil production, thanks to the recent developments in the deep-water offshore 
extraction technology. As a result, Angola is now about to become the largest African oil 
producer, a place that Nigeria had for decades. This brings out strikingly how institutional 
deficiencies, like the widespread corruption that plagues the Nigerian federal system, can 
hamper economic development by maintaining a costly level of violent conflict. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 This paper has first developed a theoretical framework for explaining how institutional 
weaknesses and low military power can combine to prevent peace from prevailing in a 
country. This game-theoretic model shows how a peace-seeking government would combine 
deterrence and redistribution for producing the most basic public good for development, 
namely peace. Moreover, it shows that a low level of institutional efficiency may be an 
incentive for the government to give up conflict prevention, unless its efficiency at deterrence 
is high enough. Hence, this model shows that the government is ultimately responsible for the 
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choice between war and peace, while the rebellion that it will face in case of war is just the 
predictable response to its strategic decisions. The model also suggests that the international 
community can help the government choose peace instead of war, if it directs its aid policy at 
reducing institutional inefficiency and at strengthening its military capacity to deter rebellion. 
These are the two inputs required for imposing peace, which might be in short supply in a 
post-conflict country. 
 Then, the paper has discussed the two main institutional solutions which have been 
tried for making peace durable in post-conflict countries, namely power-sharing and 
federalism. The discussion has centered on the cases of Chad and Nigeria, two oil-producing 
countries. Chad came out of about three decades of civil war, and enjoyed a lasting peace for 
nearly two decades when Idriss Déby took over and offered a credible power-sharing 
agreement to the southern rebels’ leader. What made that agreement credible was that a 
balance of forces was kept behind the institutional arrangement. The rebels’ army was not 
entirely dismantled, and some of its units were merged in the national army. This gave the 
former rebel general Kamougué the power to strike back in case of cheating, which made 
Idriss Déby’s promises to redistribute some of the oil money credible. By contrast, in Nigeria, 
the federal system implemented by the military governments turned out to be unable to buy 
the peace. With the return of civilian rule under Obasanjo, there were hopes that a less violent 
regime would emerge. Obasanjo’s good reputation and democratic credentials turned out to be 
unable to overcome the institutional weaknesses of the Nigerian federal system. Corruption 
being rampant at each level of government, Obasanjo’s attempt at implementing a 
redistribution strategy turned out to be impotent, and violence built up relative to the military 
governments’ era. In the end, the country is affected by widespread violence, and its 
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